

This article was downloaded by: [University of Oslo]

On: 14 June 2014, At: 19:51

Publisher: Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



Small Wars & Insurgencies

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fswi20>

A critical perspective on a recent survey of opinion in Pakistan's tribal zone

Farhat Taj ^a

^a Centre for Gender Research , University of Oslo , Norway

Published online: 20 Jun 2011.

To cite this article: Farhat Taj (2011) A critical perspective on a recent survey of opinion in Pakistan's tribal zone, *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 22:02, 402-413

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2011.573425>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the "Content") contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at <http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions>

RESEARCH REPORT

A critical perspective on a recent survey of opinion in Pakistan's tribal zone

Farhat Taj*

Centre for Gender Research, University of Oslo, Norway

This paper is a critically analysis of a public opinion survey recently conducted by the New America Foundation (NAF) and Terror Free Tomorrow (TFT) in the Federally Administered Tribal Area, FATA, of Pakistan on various issues pertaining to the war on terror. I argue that the survey misinforms about the tribal public opinion. To substantiate the argument I demonstrate that the survey is marred by ethical and methodological shortcomings.

Keywords: Survey; Al Qaida; FATA; Pakistan; Taliban

Introduction

This report questions a widely referenced survey that has recently been conducted by the New America Foundation (NAF), and Terror Free Tomorrow (TFT), in collaboration with a Pakistani NGO, Community Appraisal and Motivation Program (CAMP) about public opinion in the Federally Administered Tribal Area, FATA, of Pakistan on various issues pertaining to the war on terror.¹ This survey has been widely cited in both Pakistani and Western media sources and has come to shape the discussions on many important issues ranging from the tribal perspective on the legitimacy of the US drone strikes to their views of America in general.²

Surveyors for the study report that their 'unprecedented survey, from June 30 to July 20, 2010, consisted of face-to-face interviews of 1000 FATA residents aged 18 or older across 120 villages / sampling points in all seven tribal agencies of FATA'.³ They also claim that the survey is 'the first comprehensive public opinion survey covering sensitive political issues in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan'.⁴

FATA is a conflict zone and Al-Qaeda and Taliban have bases in the area. The Pakistan army is conducting operations in the region. There have been suicide bombings and targeted killings of the tribesmen and even women all over the area. According to the government of Pakistan over 3000 people have been

*Email: bergen34@yahoo.com

killed, almost the same number have been injured and property worth millions of dollars have been destroyed in the ongoing crisis in FATA.⁵ People of the area live in constant fear.

Conducting research both in and on conflict zones poses special challenges and ethical dilemmas and the research methodology has to be molded accordingly to ensure safety of the informants and researchers and as well as scientific quality of the research. I argue that the NAF and TFT survey provides a misleading picture of popular sentiment in FATA towards various issues covered in the survey. To substantiate my argument I will demonstrate that the NAF and TFT survey is marred by serious ethical and methodological shortcomings.

Ethical shortcomings

Public opinion survey without most of the public

It's been a long time since the international aid organizations, like UNICEF, World Food Program, global human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and International Crisis Groups, and many governments around the world, including the government of Pakistan, have focused on the crisis of the mass scale human displacement from FATA.⁶ According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), a well known international organization monitoring conflict-induced internal displacement worldwide, in July 2010 about 70% of the population of South Waziristan Agency, 84% of the Orakzai Agency population, nearly half of the Mohmand Agency population and 16% of the Bajaur population⁷ were internally displaced by the Pakistani army's recent military operations in these areas.⁸ More than 100,000 from Kurram and up to 80,000 from Khyber had also become Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs) by the same time.⁹

Between June 2010 and August 2010 I was in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (formerly the North Western Frontier Province) where most of the FATA IDPs live. I was conducting a survey for the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, IDMC, on the FATA IDPs. I made several visits to FATA during that time. My own assessment was that probably more people were displaced even than the IDMC indicated. In Orakzai Agency for example only the Shia population (about 16% of the agency's population) was spared displacement by the recent Pakistani military operations.¹⁰

During my visit I discovered that almost all Sunni areas in Upper and Lower Orakzai were emptied of their populations due to the fighting. Almost the entire Mahsud tribe was displaced as has been confirmed in a report in April 2010 by a BBC journalist who hails from South Waziristan.¹¹ The displaced people from Mohmand and Bajaur told me that most of their compatriots have become IDPs. Most people from Bara in Khyber Agency were also IDPs.¹² I also met several IDPs from North Waziristan in Kohat and

Peshawar. Almost all Sunnis from Parachinar city, Kurram, and many Shia from Satta, Kurram, are also IDPs.¹³

In summary, the IDMC statistics, my own findings and those of other observers in the FATA region lead to the conclusion that vast numbers of people have been displaced by the Pakistani army's military offensives and as well as Taliban atrocities and significant portions of the population are now living scattered in IDP camps and rented houses in surrounding regions. These are basic points that need to be taken into consideration when conducting a survey of the region, yet they are not mentioned in the recent NAF and TFT study. They are not even addressed in the study's methodology section. How can the NAF and TFT declare their survey of the public opinion in FATA 'comprehensive' when arguably most of the region's public was physically away from the area at the time of the study? How much is the survey representative of the residents of FATA in such a situation where vast numbers of the FATA's population are IDPs? Before declaring the survey 'unprecedented' or 'comprehensive', the surveyors must seriously address these fundamental questions.

Pakistan army's blockade in some areas

Another major flaw in the study is that the survey does not provide any specific details of the locations inside FATA where the data was collected. This is important to know because the Pakistani army had blocked access to some of the areas at the time survey was conducted, like Upper Orakzai and Sunni areas of Lower Orakzai. I saw the blockade first hand. I wanted to go to Upper Orakzai and Feroz Khel in Lower Orakzai but could not due to the army's blockade. If the surveyors were unable to gain access to these areas as I was this should have been noted in the study's methodology section.

Ethical considerations in an atmosphere of fear

The other shortcoming of the survey is that it does not address the security challenge concerning the survey participants. This is an ethical dilemma usually addressed by surveys conducted in conflict zones. Security of the interviewers is presented as a major challenge in a public opinion survey in Kandahar in March 2010 conducted by the Human Terrain System (HTS).¹⁴ The challenge affected the sampling issues of the survey and subsequently the survey was restricted to only 9 out of 16 districts in the Kandahar province.¹⁵ However, the HTS's survey also does not seem to pay proper attention to the security of its respondents and any limitations confronted by the survey methodology due to any security concerns for the respondents.

The NAF and TFT survey also does not identify any challenges and the limitations they might have been caused in terms of methodology minus one limitation i.e. 'local conditions' in South and North Waziristan permitted to sample on only men.¹⁶ The survey report does not elaborate what local

conditions it is referring to – any threats from Al-Qaida or Taliban, any instructions from political administration or Pakistan army or some conservative cultural norms that prevented the targeted female respondents from participation in the survey.

Researchers conducting research in a conflict zone have an obligation to prevent injury or pain to respondents. Article 7 of the guidelines for research ethics set by the Norwegian Committee for Research Ethics in the Social Science and Humanities obligates the researchers ‘to prevent research subjects from being submitted to harm and other suffering’.¹⁷ The NAF and TFT survey pays no due attention to the security of its tribal respondents.

The NAF survey also seems to include parts of FATA that are totally under the writ of the militants. Tribal affiliations (for example, Wazir, Mamonzai, Mohmand) of the survey respondents show this indeed is that case.¹⁸ The Wazir areas in Waziristan, several parts of Mohmand and Mamonzai are all under full control of the Taliban militants. The local people are overpowered in these areas, which are also inaccessible for independent investigation due to poor security.

I would like to clear this point with a few examples. In the main market of the capital of the Ahmadzai Wazir area, Wana, there is a training center for suicide bombers.¹⁹ The local people are so terrified of the terrorists that they cannot even publicly complain about it to media or the authorities.²⁰ They, however, weep in the in privacy of their homes over the fate of the Afghan refuge children, who are trained for suicide missions by Punjabi and Arab and North African terrorists.²¹ Similarly, Mamonzai in Upper Orakzai has been the headquarters of Hakeemullah Mahsud, the current leader of Tehrek-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP (i.e. the Pakistani Taliban), since the arrival of the TTP in Orakzai in 2008.²² To date the Pakistan army has not been able to break the control of the militants in Mamonzai. People in Mamonzia live under fear of the Taliban who openly patrol the streets and many are displaced due to fear of Taliban.

There are many more such examples but the point that I wish to make is that that there is no question of locals giving honest answers in a survey like this, because doing so may mean their instant beheading by the Taliban extremists who control these areas.²³ Many have been brutally killed for displeasing the militants by freely expressing their opinions.²⁴ The NAF and TFT survey report does not elaborate how it made sure that the people being surveyed in these Taliban-controlled zones freely expressed their opinion.

Methodological inaccuracies

Is it a comprehensive survey?

NAF and TFT claim to have conducted a ‘comprehensive’ survey on the public opinion in FATA. But the survey cannot be regarded as comprehensive in terms of the geographical, tribal and political exclusions that it makes.

Geographical exclusion

The survey is limited to the seven agencies of FATA and excludes all the Frontier Regions, FRs, which are part of FATA.²⁵ This includes FR Kohat (population 88,000), FR Banu, (population 19,000) FR D.I.Khan (39,000), FR Tank (27,000), FR Laki Marwat (7000) and FR Peshawar (54,000).²⁶ It is pertinent to mention that all of the FRs are affected by terrorism. People from FR Kohat and FR Peshawar²⁷ have become IDPs. The atmosphere of fear is as much as it is in the seven agencies of FATA. The security forces of Pakistan have been conducting operations in all FR's that have killed, injured and displaced people. Some of the important Taliban commanders are from the FRs like Tariq Afridi, Arif Afridi, etc.

As I am writing these lines breaking news is coming that a suicide bomber attacked a mosque in Darra Adam Khel, FR Kohat, killing 95 worshipers, including a leader of the local anti-Taliban lashkar (militia).²⁸ The terrorism in the seven agencies is linked with terrorism in the FRs and vice versa. A survey that excludes all the FRs does not deserve to be regarded as comprehensive in terms of geographical coverage of FATA.

Tribal exclusion

Tribal affiliations of respondents sampled in the survey exclude some of the important tribes in terms of size and resistance to Taliban, for example, Ali Khel, Salarzai, Mahsud, Story Khel etc.

Ali Khel, the biggest tribe in Orakzai, made an anti-Taliban lashkar (militia or armed group) that killed Taliban, burnt down their centers and resultantly its entire tribal leadership (over 100 tribal leaders) died in a subsequent suicide attack.²⁹ Some of the smaller tribes in Orakzai, like Meshti also supported the Ali Khel Lashkar and one of its tribal leaders, Ghani Shah, died along with the Ali Khel tribal leaders in the suicide attack. No respondent from the Meshti tribe is included either. Similarly, there is no respondent from the Feorz Khel, Orakzai, which also offered armed resistance to the Taliban. An important tribe in Bajaur is Salarzai, the first tribe in FATA that mustered an anti-Taliban lashkar and has managed to keep their area free of the Taliban up to this date. The next excluded tribe is the Mahsud of South Waziristan. Most Mahsud tribesmen and women preferred to repeatedly become IDP instead of giving in to the Taliban pressure to join them as fighters and supporters. Some of the leading Taliban commanders, Baitullah Mahsud, Hakeemullah Mahsud, Qari Hussain, come from this tribe. This is the tribe in which innocent civilians arguably suffered the most at hands of both the Taliban commanders and Pakistan army.³⁰ Story Khel in Orakzai is a small tribe but important in terms of resistance to the Taliban. It is the only tribe in FATA where women initiated the armed resistance to the Taliban.³¹ This tribe is also excluded from the NAF and TFT respondent sample.

There is no signal tribe all over FATA that can be termed as totally pro-Taliban. There are, however, some tribes that opposed the Taliban with

one voice. They displayed extraordinary courage against all odds and suffered tremendously. In other words several tribes that have turned against the Taliban have not been included in the survey for unknown reasons. This could profoundly distort the findings of the study on such issues as local perceptions of the Taliban or US drone strikes against the Taliban.

Political exclusion

The survey questions exclude important Pakhtun nationalist political personalities that have a following in FATA. No scientific reason given for not including the names of the Pakhtun nationalists political leaders, Asfandyar Wali Khan and Mehmood Khan Achakzai, in the list of the leaders from which the respondents had to choose someone they had favorable opinion of.³² Similarly, a prominent Pakhtun nationalist political party, Pakhtunkhwa Mili Awami Party, PMAP, is excluded from the list of political parties from which the respondents had to choose from in case of any elections.

Exclusion of the Pakhtun nationalists is a very significant methodological error. The Pakhtun nationalists have always opposed religious militancy right from the days of the Afghan *Jehad* against the Soviets to the Taliban and Al-Qaida of today. The Pakhtun nationalist political party, Awami National Party (ANP) has been urging Pakistan army to conduct military operations against the Taliban and Al-Qiada since 2002, the time when the army was reluctant to do so. Today, the ANP – the ruling party in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa – extends political support to the army operations against the Taliban. Although, the Pakistani law does not allow political parties to function inside FATA, many FATA tribesmen and women play active political roles in the politics of the Pakhtun nationalist political parties outside FATA. Targeted killing of the anti-Taliban tribesmen started in 2003 in Waziristan. The first people who were target killed were nationalist political workers in the ranks and files Pakhtunkhwa Mili Awami Party (PMAP). Several of the Pakhtun nationalists have issued manifestos condemning the Taliban and praising drone strikes and asking Pakistan army to conduct targeted operations against the Taliban.³³ An umbrella group of mainly Pakhtun nationalists organizations, including FATA based organizations, called *Amn Tehrek* (Peace Movement), vocally opposes Taliban and publicly support the US drone attacks on the militants positions in FATA. Pakhtun nationalists all over FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa have been target killed mainly because of their staunch opposition to all kinds of religious militancy.

The NAF and TFT survey report gives no scholarly reason for the exclusion of the national political personalities and the party that have a large following in FATA. In the absence of any scholarly explanations the surveyors' construction of the questions reflects a bias against the Pakhtun nationalists in line with the Pakistani state's disdain for the Pakhtun nationalists. In this context the survey seems to be skewed against the Pakhtun nationalists in FATA.

Not the ‘first’ public opinion survey in FATA

NAF and TFT claim to have conducted the ‘first’ public opinion survey in FATA. This is factually wrong. The first ever survey in FATA was conducted between November 2008 and January 2009 by the Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy (AIRRA) a Pakistan based think tank made by the local Pakhtun researchers and political activists in response to growing terrorism on the Pakhtun land in Pakistan. The AIRRA survey, however, was limited in terms of geography and conducted only in Waziristan and Kurram. The NAF and TFT survey was conducted in seven agencies of FATA. Moreover, the AIRRA survey dealt only with the tribal public opinion about the US drone attacks in the area. The NAF and TFT’s survey is wider in scope and covers many other issues about the war on terror besides the US drone strikes in FATA. Thus the latter survey may be more comprehensive in terms of its geographical outreach and range the issues it covered, but is not the ‘first’ public opinion survey in FATA.

Comparative analysis of AIRRA survey with NAF &TFT’s survey

The NAF and TFT survey states: ‘views of FATA residents are not inconsistent with past Terror Free Tomorrow / New America surveys of Pakistanis generally, though the intensity of opposition to the U.S. military inside FATA is significantly higher’.³⁴ The survey findings are however inconsistent with the AIRRA survey diametrically, in which 58% disagreed that ‘anti-American feelings in the area increased due to drone attacks’; 55% rejected that ‘drone attacks bringing about fear and terror in the common people’, and 52% said the ‘drones are accurate in their strikes’.³⁵ This inconsistency may lead one to believe that either the AIRRA survey or that of the NAF and TFT was skewed deliberately. How else could the two surveys come up with such discrepancies?

I would like to explain the background of the AIRRA survey before I comment of the NAF and TFT survey.

The AIRRA survey was conducted between November 2008 and January 2009. By that time the drone attacks had been going on for several years in Waziristan. The first drone attack in Waziristan was in 2004. By that time the targeted killing of anti-Taliban people was well underway. The people were terrified of the Taliban, foreign Al-Qaida and intelligence agents of Pakistan. They perceived a state collusion with the Taliban and due to this perception could not rely on state support. They continue to live in fear out of the Taliban and Al-Qaida. Thus the people in Waziristan were witnessing the bloody drama and carnage on their soil much before people in other parts of Pakistan and even in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa came to know about them. Out of sheer helplessness they could do nothing, but certainly welcomed the drone attacks that killed the killers who had the blood of innocent Waziristani people on their hands.

My friends at AIRRA and I had an idea about this situation before the establishment of AIRRA in 2008 that we established with the aim to document first hand information from FATA. Following the establishment of AIRRA we

thought that the tribal public opinion about the drone strikes needs to be ascertained, especially in the context of the anti-drone attacks reports in media.³⁶ We discussed what could a good way to do so. We agreed that a survey would do the job. Hence we did the survey. Like any survey in the world, the AIRRA survey could be subjected to scientific scrutiny.

The NAF and TFT survey, on the other hand, seems to be marred by some ethical and methodological flaws. The NAF and TFT do not, for example, recognize the mass displacement from FATA in their survey. It does not pay the necessary attention to the fact that people in FATA live in fear and may need special ethical and methodological considerations in a survey like this. Structuring of some of the survey questions may be leading or misleading. For example, asking somebody in the military-dominated Pakistan whether s/he likes the Chief of Army Staff (COAF) could be a leading question.³⁷ This is especially true about people in FATA, who are terrified by the COAF led intelligence agencies of Pakistan.³⁸ Similarly asking someone what they think about US drone attacks that are killing Taliban when the Taliban control the area might lead to less than honest responses out of a natural inclination for self-preservation.

A misleading survey

Media in Pakistan and abroad are quoting the NAF and TFT survey to substantiate the controversial positions about FATA, namely the drone strikes are unpopular in the tribal area or the drone attacks kill innocent civilians.³⁹ This may be tantamount to misleading the public around the world. In Pakistan a pro-negotiations-with-Taliban political party has already referred to the survey as a proof of the truthfulness of their politics.⁴⁰ I am afraid the survey may mislead FATA researchers around the world. Due to security problems most researchers do not have the option of cross checking the survey claims through independent investigations in FATA.

Moreover, this is not the first time NAF has authored misleading information about FATA. The think tank produced a research report, 'The year of the drone', that claims that 32% of those killed in US drone strikes are innocent civilians. I have questioned that report through my research paper, 'That year of the drone misinformation', published in *Small Wars and Insurgencies* in September 2010.

Concluding remarks

In short I find the NAF and TFT survey on FATA misleading. There have also been other research reports on FATA that may also be termed as misleading.⁴¹ I am however, positive that within the US there are researchers who could author a high quality scientific research on FATA through their own investigations based on direct interactions with people of FATA. I am pleased to mention that at least two US researchers, Christian Fair of the George Town University, US, and

Brian Williams of Massachusetts University, US, have visited Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa to meet the people of FATA. I would like to bring to the attention of the FATA researchers around the world that many people of FATA are displaced all over Pakistan. Direct access to FATA may be dangerous, but the researchers can still have direct interactions with people of FATA in safer places in Pakistan. I would encourage them to do so

Notes

1. Bergen, Doherty and Ballen, 'Public Opinion in Pakistan Tribal Region'.
2. For example, see, Porter, 'Report Shows Drone Strikes Based on Scant Evidence'; 'Saying "No" to Drone Strikes'.
3. *Ibid.*, 1.
4. *Ibid.*
5. 'Cost of Conflict in FATA', Fata Secretariat, Government of Pakistan <http://fata.gov.pk/files/costconflict.pdf>.
6. See for example, the World Food Program report 'Logistics Augmentation in response to the IDP situation in North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas', <http://www.wfp.org/content/logistics-augmentation-response-idp-situation-north-western-frontier-province-nwfp-and-federally-adm>; 'Unicef Needs US\$ 4.25 Million to Address the Immediate Emergency Needs of Displaced Children and their Families in the Northwest Frontier Province and in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas', http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/files/UNICEF_Pakistan_HAU_9_April_2009.pdf; two Amnesty International reports on the FATA IDP's are: 'Pakistan / Afghanistan: Thousands of Displaced Civilians in Border Area Have Right to International Assistance', and 'As if Hell fell on me': The human rights crisis in northwest Pakistan' <http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/pakistanafghanistan-thousands-displaced-civilians-border-area-have-right> & <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA33/004/2010/en/1ea0b9e0-c79d-4f0f-a43d-98f7739ea92e/asa330042010en.pdf>; Two reports of International Crisis Group about related to FATA IDPs are: 'Pakistan: The Worsening IDP Crisis', and 'Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA', [http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/B111%20Pakistan%20-%20The%20Worsening%20IDP%20Crisis.ashx](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/B111%20Pakistan%20-%20The%20Worsening%20IDP%20Crisis.ashx) & http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/178_pakistan___countering_militancy_in_fata.ashx
7. The total population of Bajaur is 595,227 according to the 1998 census in Pakistan. But the IDCM adjusted the population of Bajaur to the population growth rate in the agency that made the total population of Bajaur 949,000. According to the IDM adjusted figure the IDP's from Bajaur were 15% of the total population. However, according to population of Bajaur in the 1998 census, 25% of the Bajaur population was displaced by July 2010. Moreover, the total population adjusted by the IDMC to the expected growth in North Waziristan and Mohmand are much smaller as compared to Bajaur. In the case of South Waziristan, Khyber and Kurram— no change in population figures— the same as in the 1998 census.
8. IDP figures and Registration. On the IDMC link: [http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/\(httpEnvelopes\)/944667B8E6F38FDFC125778C00711DD9?OpenDocument#36.2.1](http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/(httpEnvelopes)/944667B8E6F38FDFC125778C00711DD9?OpenDocument#36.2.1)
9. *Ibid.*
10. This is because the Shia area was never controlled by the Taliban, although there have been terrorist attacks committed by the Taliban in this area.

11. The report is from the BBC Urdu Service and is available on: http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/pakistan/2010/04/100403_vana_trip_as.shtml
12. This information is based upon the author's interviews with Bara IDP's in Jalojai IDP's camp in Nowshara in July and August 2010.
13. This information is based upon the author's interviews with IDPs from Parachinar for a working paper about the IDP's children for the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), Norway, together with Karin Ask, a researcher at the CMP.
14. 'Kandahar Province Survey Report'.
15. Ibid.
16. Bergen, Doherty and Ballen. 'Public Opinion in Pakistan Tribal Region', 13.
17. 'Guidelines for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences, Law and Humanities'. National Committee for Research Ethics in Norway, 12. [http://www.etikkom.no/Documents/English-publications/Guidelines%20for%20research%20ethics%20in%20the%20social%20sciences,%20law%20and%20the%20humanities%20\(2006\).pdf](http://www.etikkom.no/Documents/English-publications/Guidelines%20for%20research%20ethics%20in%20the%20social%20sciences,%20law%20and%20the%20humanities%20(2006).pdf)
18. Bergen, Doherty and Ballen. 'Public Opinion in Pakistan Tribal Region', 33–34.
19. Interviews conducted by the author with Ahmadzai Wazir tribesmen from Wana for the book, Taj, *Taliban and Anti-Taliban*.
20. Interviews conducted by the author with Ahmadzai Wazir tribesmen from Wana for the book, Taj, *Taliban and Anti-Taliban*.
21. Interviews conducted by the author with Ahmadzai Wazir tribesmen from Wana for the book, Taj, *Taliban and Anti-Taliban*.
22. For more information see Taj and Rothing, 'Resisting Taliban Through Lashkars'.
23. For information about the atmosphere of fear in FATA see Khan, *Armageddon in Pakistan*, especially 137–40, 174–78.
24. I am preparing a list of people, who were target killed all over FATA. These are the people who showed opposition to the Taliban through expression of their views that do not concur with the Taliban and / or formation of anti-Taliban lashkars (armed groups). This list will appear in the author's book *Taliban and Anti-Taliban*.
25. For more information on the physical geography of FATA, see the following link from the Government of Pakistan's website: http://fata.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=51&Itemid=85
26. The FR's population figures taken from the FATA Secretariat official website: http://fata.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=56&Itemid=92
27. From FR Peshawar 40,000 out of its total population (54,000) were IDPs by July 2010 according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC): [http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/\(httpEnvelopes\)/944667B8E6F38FDFC125778C00711DD9?OpenDocument](http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/(httpEnvelopes)/944667B8E6F38FDFC125778C00711DD9?OpenDocument)
28. 'Darra Blast Toll reaches 95'.
29. For more details about the actions of the Ali Khel Lashkar against the Taliban and subsequent assassination of the Ali Khel tribal leadership see Taj and Rothing, 'Resisting Taliban Through Lashkars'.
30. The Pakistani military launched operation Rah-e-Nijat (Path to Deliverance), against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the Mehsud tribal areas of South Waziristan agency in October 2009. The operation displaced the Mahsud tribesmen, women and children, who now live as Internally Displaced People (IDPs), in miserable conditions in the surrounding districts, Tank, D.I.Khan, Banu and other parts of the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province. The tribesmen and women are resisting going back to their area despite the authorities' pressure. I have had several interviews with the displaced Mahsud tribesmen and women in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. They insist that the army has not eliminated the Taliban and Al-Qaida in South Waziristan.

The terrorists have fled to other areas and would most probably come back after the departure of the army. The state has not offered any security-related help to the Mahsud tribes. The Taliban and Al-Qaida would begin to terrorize the Mahsud tribes upon their return. The Mahsud tribe is no match to battle hardened Al-Qaida and the Taliban. Secondly, they also insist that the Mahsud tribe does not trust the intelligence agencies of Pakistan. The tribe understands, according to the interviewees, the Taliban and the intelligence agencies of Pakistan are in league with each other and kill innocent tribesmen and women in fake operations.

31. For more information on the Story Khel resistance to the Taliban see Taj and Rothing, 'Resisting Taliban Through Lashkars'.
32. Question 9a on page 21 of the survey report. This question does not include Asfandyar Wali Khan, Leader of the Awami National Party, ANP, and Mehmood Kha Achekzai, leader of Pakhtunkhwa Mili Awami Party, PMAP. See Bergen, Doherty and Ballen. 'Public Opinion in Pakistan Tribal Region'.
33. Like the Peshawar Declaration, see on: <http://www.pukhtunkhwa.com/id70.html>.
34. Bergen, Doherty and Ballen. 'Public Opinion in Pakistan Tribal Region', 4.
35. Taj, 'Drone Attacks – a Survey'.
36. Taj, 'The Year of the Drone Misinformation'.
37. Bergen, Doherty and Ballen. 'Public Opinion in Pakistan Tribal Region', 21.
38. Khan, *Armageddon in Pakistan*.
39. Taj, 'The Year of the Drone Misinformation'; Fricker, Plaw and Williams, 'New Light'.
40. On *Dunya Today*, a TV talk show on a Pakistan private TV channel, *Dunya TV*, 21 October 2010, Imran Khan, leader of the Tehrek-e-Insaf Party, referred to the New America Foundation survey (25) on FATA and claimed that Tehrek-e-Insaf popularity has increased. Imran Khan's party wants dialogue with Taliban, where people in FATA want targeted military operations against the Taliban, a view that clearly came out in the interviews the author conducted with FATA IDP's for the IDMC in summer 2010 and also for my book, *Taliban and Anti-Taliban*. The same view is very forcefully exerted in the Peshawar Declaration, available on: <http://www.pukhtunkhwa.com/id70.html>.
41. Examples of such research literature are: Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 2009; Liebl, 'Pushtun, Tribalism, Leadership, Islam and Taliban', 2007; Markey, 'Securing Pakistan's Tribal Areas', 2008; Dogar, 'The Talibanisation of Pakistan's Western Region', 2009; Curtis, 'Denying Terrorists Safe Havens in Pakistan', 2006, 3.

Bibliography

- Bergen, Peter, Patrick Doherty, and Ken Ballen. 'Public Opinion in Pakistan Tribal Region' (Survey on FATA public opinion by the New America Foundation and Terror Free Tomorrow, 2010), <http://www.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/FATApoll.pdf>
- Bergen, Peter, and Katherine Tiedemann. 'The Year of the Drone, An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004–2010'. New America Foundation, 2010, http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/bergentiedemann_0.pdf
- Curtis, Lisa, 'Denying Terrorists Safe Havens in Pakistan'. *Backgrounder* (the Heritage Foundation), 26 October 2006.
- 'Darra Blast Toll Reaches 95'. *Daily Times*, 7 November 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\11\07\story_7-11-2010_pg7_13
- Dogar, Ali Yasub, 'The Talibanisation of Pakistan's Western Region' (Working Paper no. 98, Institute of South Asian Studies, University of Singapore, 2009), <http://www.isasnus.org/events/workingpapers/97.pdf>

- Fricker, Matthew, Avery Plaw, and Brian Williams. 'New Light on the Accuracy of the CIA's Predator Drone Campaign in Pakistan'. *Terrorism Monitor* VIII, no. 41 (2010); http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37165&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=cdd658051e
- 'Kandahar Province Survey Report'. *Wired.com*, 5 April 2010, http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/dangerroom/2010/04/kandahar-province-survey-report-5-apr-2010-for-isaf.pdf
- Khan. *Armageddon in Pakistan: The Crisis of a Failed Feudal Economy*. Pittsburgh, PA: RoseDog Books, 2009.
- Kilcullen, David. *The Accidental Guerrilla, Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*. London: Hurts & Company, 2009.
- Liebl, Vern, 'Pushtun, Tribalism, Leadership, Islam and Taliban: A Short View'. *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 18, no. 3 (2007): 492–510.
- Markey, Daniel, 'Securing Pakistan's Tribal Areas'. Council Special Report No.36. Council of Foreign Relations, Center for Preventative Action, August 2008.
- Porter, Gareth, 'Report Shows Drone Strikes Based on Scant Evidence'. *IPS News*, <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=53194>
- 'Saying "No" to Drone Strikes'. *Express Tribune* (Pakistan), 30 September 2010, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/56801/saying-no-to-drone-strikes/>
- Taj, Farhat, 'Drone Attacks – a Survey'. *The News*, 5 March 2009.
- Taj, Farhat, *Taliban and Anti-Taliban*, Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Forthcoming.
- Taj, Farhat, 'The Year of the Drone Misinformation'. *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 21, no. 3 (2010): 529–35.
- Taj, Farhat, and Jacob Rothing. 'Resisting Displacement by the Taliban in Pakistan'. *Forced Migration Review* 37 (2011), <http://www.fmreview.org/non-state/Taj-Rothing.html>